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Abstract: We use Mixed-Complementarity-Problem programming to implement tariff rate 
quotas (TRQ) in the global CGE LINKAGE model. We apply the approach to tariff rate quotas in 
sugar markets in OECD countries. We calibrate the model on 2000 policy levels for OECD 
countries to reflect the full implementation of their World Trade Organization commitments. We 
look at reforms of TRQ and TRQ-like schemes in the EU, the United States, and Japan, as well 
as multilateral trade liberalization. We derive the impact of reforms on welfare, bilateral trade 
flows, and terms of trade. A 33-percent multilateral decrease of ad-valorem tariffs, combined 
with a 33-percent increase in imports under TRQ-like schemes in the EU, the United States, and 
Japan, induces a global welfare gain of about 889 million dollars. These three countries’ trade 
policies create substantial trade diversion, which excludes many low-cost producers from trading 
opportunities. An expansion of their import quotas alone, without multilateral trade 
liberalization, induces welfare gains but preserves most of the trade diversion patterns. The latter 
diversion benefits some Least Developed Countries’ producers because of granted bilateral TRQ 
allocations. In the context of greater market access, reductions in tariffs in the EU and the United 
States, and in border “surcharges” in Japan will have to be dramatic before they can significantly 
affect trade flows as compared to TRQ expansion. Full multilateral trade liberalization induces 
global welfare gains of about $3 billion. 
Keywords: Doha, trade negotiations, liberalization, sugar, tariff rate quota, TRQ, CGE model 
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I. Introduction 
We use a Mixed-Complementarity-Problem (MCP) programming approach (Rutherford; van der 
Mensbrugghe 2003b) to fully implement tariff rate quotas in the global CGE LINKAGE model 
(van der Mensbrugghe 2003a). Previous attempts to model TRQs in multi-country models have 
typically used linearized inequalities to implement TRQ reforms (e.g., Bach and Pearson; Elbehri 
et al.). Modeling TRQs remains a difficult task because of the discontinuous regime switching 
inherent in TRQ regimes. Further, accounting for TRQ rents requires additional model 
modifications to keep balanced flows in the global social accounting matrix.  
We apply the methodology to tariff rate quotas in protected OECD sugar markets. Sugar 
prices in the European Union, Japan, and the United States are more than double those in the 
world market because of high protection to domestic producers relying on trade barriers. Such 
protection has distorted internationally traded sugar and in the process, has deprived lower-cost 
developing country exporters of growth opportunities. Hence the sugar application is policy 
relevant in the double context of agricultural reform and “development round” of the current 
negotiations of the World Trade Organization (WTO). We calibrate the model on 2000 trade 
policy levels for OECD countries to reflect the full implementation of commitments under the 
Uruguay round of the WTO. We consider several reform scenarios: OECD import quota 
expansion, decrease in OECD out-of-quota tariffs, their combination, and multilateral 
liberalization. The analysis derives the impact of reforms on production, trade flows, quota rents, 
prices, and welfare. 
The LINKAGE Model is a global, multi-region, multi-sector, dynamic applied general 
equilibrium model. It is currently implemented in GAMS and its specification is virtually free of 
references to specific dimensions (region, sector, or time). The model is accompanied by an 
aggregation facility, which is used to aggregate the extensive GTAP dataset into a tractable  3
dataset for simulation purposes. The output of the aggregation facility is the primary input for the 
model. The aggregation facility also produces some auxiliary data, such as population, and the 
model user is expected to provide values for all key elasticities. The dynamic version of the 
model also requires a series of assumptions, which are to be provided independently of the 
aggregation facility. The model is described in detail in van der Mensbrugghe (2003a). The 
results presented here are generated by a comparative-static version of the LINKAGE model, with 
the world divided into 16 countries/regions. The model incorporates 22 sectors, including a 
combined raw and refined sugar sector. 
We find that a 33-percent multilateral decrease of ad-valorem tariffs, combined with a 
33-percent increase in imports under TRQ-like schemes in the EU, the United States, and Japan, 
induces a global welfare gain of about 889 million dollars. These three countries’ trade policies 
create substantial trade diversion, which excludes many low-cost producers from trading 
opportunities. An expansion of their import quotas alone, without multilateral trade 
liberalization, induces welfare gains but preserves most of the trade diversion patterns. The latter 
diversion benefits some Least Developed Countries’ (LDCs) producers, because of granted 
bilateral TRQ allocations. In the context of greater market access, reductions in tariffs in the EU 
and the United States, and in border “surcharges” in Japan will have to be dramatic before they 
can significantly affect trade flows as compared to TRQ expansion. Full multilateral trade 
liberalization induces global welfare gains of about $3 billion. 
In the following section, the paper first describes the essence of the implementation of 
TRQs in the model. Then salient features of trade policies in the three OECD countries follow. 
The fourth and fifth sections spell out important simplifying assumptions underlying the analysis 
and the policy reform scenarios considered. Results follow, and then the paper concludes with 
some policy implications for the current WTO negotiations.   4
To bring the introduction to a close, we summarize the contribution of our paper, which 
is twofold. First, there is the implementation of TRQs in CGE modeling using MCP 
programming. This is a methodological contribution. Second, we parameterize Japan’s sugar 
policy, a complex system of tariffs, surcharges, and import targets implemented by parastatals 
acting as state-trading agencies. This new policy information and parameterization are then 
incorporated in a quantitative analysis of sugar policy reforms in OECD countries and in a 
multilateral setting. This is an empirical contribution to the long-standing debate on sugar policy. 
II. Modeling TRQs 
Tariff rate quotas (TRQs), an old policy instrument, were used in the Uruguay Round Agreement 
on Agriculture (URAA) to permit minimum market access and at the same time convert a wide-
range of agricultural non-tariff barriers (NTBs) into tariffs (so-called tariffication) (Skully). 
Under the TRQ some level of imports is allowed  at a relatively low or zero tariff rate, but any 
imported quantity above the quota is taxed at a higher or prohibitive rate. Let XM
q represent the 
quota and XM the level of imports. If XM is less than XM
q, i.e., the level of imports is less than 
the quota level; the domestic price of imports is equal to the border price, PWM, times 1 plus the 
in-quota tariff rate, τ
m_i. If the level of imports is equal to the quota, i.e. the quota is binding, the 
domestic import price is equal to the border price times 1 plus the in-quota tariff rate plus a 
premium, τ
m_p. Should import demand exceed the quota, the out-of-quota tariff rate, τ
m_o will be 
applied to all out-of-quota imports and the domestic price will equal the border price times 1 plus 
the out-of-quota tariff rate. 
In a simple 1-sector static case, this can be formulated using the following equations (the 
multi-country extension is presented in Appendix A). Equations (1) and (2) define respectively 
the price of exports and imports, PE and PM. The former is simply the world price, WPE, times 
the exchange rate, ER. The latter is also equal to the world price, WPM, times the exchange rate,  5
adjusted for the appropriate tariff schedule. If imports are within quota, the appropriate tariff rate 
is simply the in-quota tariff rate, τ
m_i, and the premium will be zero.  If imports are at quota or 
above, the appropriate tariff rate is the in-quota tariff rate plus a premium. While demand is 
constrained to the quota level, the import premium will be endogenous. If demand is above the 
quota level, the appropriate tariff rate is τ
m_o, i.e. the out-of-quota tariff. The equation holds in 
this case because the premium is equal to the difference between the out-of-quota tariff and the 
within-quota tariff. 
 (1)  WPE ER PE . = , and 
 (2)  ( )
p m i m WPM ER PM
_ _ 1 . τ τ + + = . 
Income, YH, in this simple model is equal to the value of production, XP, plus tariff 
revenues and a share, χ, of the quota rents, TRQY, equation (3). Consumption, XA, is equal to 
income divided by the price of consumption, PA, equation (4). Armington demand, XA, equated 
with consumption, is split into two components assuming that domestic and import goods are 
imperfect substitutes. Equations (5) and (6) determine respectively demand for the domestic 
good, XD, and import demand, XM. The elasticity of substitution is given by σ. The Armington 
price, PA, is derived from the CES dual price formula, equation (7), where PD is the price of the 
domestic good and PM, derived above is the price of imported goods. 
 (3)  TRQY XM WPM ER XM WPM ER XP PP YH
o o m i i m . . . . . . . .
_ _ χ τ τ + + + = , 
 (4)  PA YH XA / = , 
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 = , and 
 (7)  [ ] () σ σ σ α α
− − − + =
1 / 1 1 1 PM PD PA
m d .  6
Analogous to the Armington assumption, output is allocated between the domestic and 
export market using a transformation function where the elasticity of transformation is given by 
γ. Equation (8) determines the producer price, PP. It is essentially an equilibrium condition 
where the CET dual price formula replaces the CET primal aggregation function. Equations (9) 
and (10) determine respectively the supply functions for the domestic market, XD, and the export 
market, XE. Note that the XD variable is the same in both equations (5) and (9) and in fact that 
supply equals demand equilibrium condition is subsumed in these two equations: 
 (8)  [ ] () ω ω ω γ γ
+ + + + =
1 / 1 1 1 PE PD PP
e d , 
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 = . 
Constraint (11) determines the level of the in-quota imports. The constraint represents the 
orthogonality constraint for the in-quota import level, i.e.,( ) 0
_ = −
p m i q XM XM τ . This condition 
holds if the premium is zero, in which case the in-quota import level is less than the quota, or if 
the in-quota import level equals the quota and the premium is positive. Similarly, constraint (12), 
determining the premium level, also represents an orthogonality constraint for the premium. If 
the level of imports exceeds the quota, i.e. the out-of-quota level of imports is positive, then the 
premium is strictly equal to the difference between the out-of-quota and within quota rates. If the 
out-of-quota level of imports is zero, then the premium is endogenous and lower than the 
difference in the two rates. Equation (13) determines the level of the out-of-quota imports by 
residual. Equation (14) describes the value of the quota rents. There are three situations. If the 
quota is not binding, the premium rate is zero and the rents will be zero. If the quota is binding 
but imports are equal to the quota, the premium is endogenous and the rents are simply equal to  7
the quota level times the premium rate. The third situation is when imports exceed the quota. In 
this case, the premium is equal to the difference in the two rates, i.e. the holders of the quotas can 
import at the lower within-quota rate but sell at the higher out-of-quota rate and therefore pocket 
the revenues generated by the difference. These four equations are 
 (11) 
q i XM XM ≤  with   0
_ ≥
p m τ , 
 (12) 
o m p m i m _ _ _ τ τ τ ≤ +  with  0 ≥
o XM , 
 (13) 
o i XM XM XM + = , and 
 (14) 
q p m XM WPM ER TRQY
_ . . τ = . 
Next we explain how parameter χ is calibrated in the model, keeping the database 
unchanged and first assuming the quota is binding but no out-of-quota imports occur. In this case 
there are two calibration choices. One could assume knowledge of the premium and the rent 
share parameter is calibrated, or vice versa. In any case, the model assumes that all quota rents 
accrue to the government. In a single household model this will have no in-country welfare 
implications since under the standard closure rule changes to the government fiscal position are 
financed through lump sum taxes. In the base year, the following knowledge is given: (i) trade at 
world prices inclusive of the premium rents transferred to the exporter, R, (ii) import tariff 
collections inclusive of the premium rents captured by the importer, Y, and (iii) the in-quota 
tariff rate, τ
i. 
The following two identities must hold in any case: 
 (15)  () W W R
p τ χ − + = 1 , and 
 (16)  W W Y
p i χτ τ + = . 
where W is the value of imports at world prices exclusive of the import tariff and premium, and 
τ
p is the premium rate. Equation (15) states that the observed value of imports at world prices is  8
equal to the value of trade exclusive of the tariff premium income plus the share of the quota 
rents captured by the exporter. Equation (16) reflects the value of government revenues. It is 
equal to the revenues generated by the in-quota imports plus the importer’s share of the quota 
rents. This is a system of two equations in two unknowns, leading to the following solution: 























In the alternative, the premium, τ
p is known and the distribution share, χ, is unknown. The same 





















If over-quota imports occur, the in- and over-quota tariffs need to be specified. The premium will 
simply be the difference in the two tariff rates. The quota needs to be specified. From this 
information, one can deduce the share of the quota rent revenues accruing to the importing 
country. Appendix A extends this basic framework to a global model with TRQs assigned to 
bilateral flows. Van der Mensbrugghe (2003b) provides the GAMS code to implement the TRQs. 
III. Sugar Trade Policies in the EU-15, Japan, and the United States 
The policy description focuses on trade distortions in the EU, the United States, and Japan 
affecting sugar imports by these countries. The policies in the three countries are based on TRQs 
(EU, the United States) or TRQ-like scheme (Japan). Mitchell provides a detailed description of 
all trade and domestic sugar policies for major players in world markets. When relevant to the 
analysis the note mentions features of domestic programs or export market distortions, which 
interact with the TRQs.  9
EU TRQ policy 
TRQs are the cornerstone of EU sugar protection along with production subsidies and supply 
controls (so-called quota A and B sugar), and export subsidies (Mitchell). The EU TRQ scheme 
sets bilateral import quotas. Preferential access at guaranteed high price serves as “development 
assistance” to 46 countries from Africa, the Caribbean, and the Pacific (ACP) originally secured 
under the 1975 Lomé Convention. The Sugar Protocol (SP) of the Lomé Convention specified 
original quotas for 1.295 million tons of white sugar equivalent, and an additional 10,000 tons 
for India. An additional import allocation was made of between 200,000 and 350,000 tons of 
sugar to primarily ACP countries in 1995, under ‘Special Preference Sugar’ (SPS). This 
allocation was not permanent, the quantity could vary based on import needs, and the price paid 
for SPS sugar was 85 percent of the SP guaranteed price. The EU accepted the WTO import 
commitments of the new EU members joining in 1995, including a tariff quota of 42,000 tons 
from Brazil, with a within quota tariff rate of 98 ECU per ton (49 percent ad valorem equivalent 
in 2000). Several countries in the Balkans have temporary access to the EU market and imports 
under this program totaled about 100,000 tons in 2001/02. In total, the EU permanent 
commitment is 1.39 million tons (white sugar equivalent) plus additional quantities of up to 
450,000 tons of temporary imports. All out-of-quota imports face a specific tariff of 346 Euro or 
174 percent in ad valorem equivalent in 2000. The model uses these ad valorem tariff values. 
These EU import commitments were expanded by the Everything But Arms initiative 
(EBA) in 2001.  The EBA initiative allows duty-free access to the EU sugar market to the 48 
least developed countries (39 ACP countries). Initially, EBA imports enter duty-free but are 
limited by quotas, and counted against the SPS sugar quota (a zero sum effect on imports but 
with distribution effects within exporters). The EBA quota will increase annually until full duty-
free access for white and raw sugar is allowed in 2009.   10
Virtually all-preferential sugar imports are re-exported with a unit export subsidy 
corresponding to the difference between the preferential import price and the prevailing world 
price. The EU has WTO commitments on subsidized exports, both in terms of maximum 
subsidized volume and total subsidy outlays. The export volume commitment covers the re-
exported preferential imports and EU sugar production under the so-called quota A and B. The 
latter is too costly to be competitive on world market. An increase in EU preferential imports 
(i.e., an increase in TRQ quota) would then induce a direct offset of this subsidized domestic 
production under quotas A and B to meet the WTO commitment limiting export volume. 
Following this increase in preferential imports (increased TRQ quota), the EU aggregate supply 
of unsubsidized sugar (so-called C sugar) should increase moderately. The latter occurs because 
some but not all EU producers can compete at world price levels and replace the lost quota sugar 
by production and exports of C sugar (Frandsen et al.). Hence aggregate domestic supply in the 
EU should decrease as a result of increasing preferential imports but by a lesser amount than the 
TRQ quota increase. 
Japan import policy 
The Agriculture and Livestock Industries Corporation (ALIC) acts as a state-trading agency in 
the Japanese sugar market, with a monopsony on imported raw sugar purchases and a monopoly 
on the domestic resale of these raw sugar imports. The Ministry of Agriculture Forest and 
Fisheries (MAFF) determines an annual import volume target, usually around 1,500,000 metric 
tons (Dyck). MAFF determines the Japanese price of raw sugar imposing a hefty surcharge over 
the world price of raw sugar (about 84 percent in ad-valorem equivalent in 2000 (Fukuda, Dyck, 
and Stout; Dyck)). If imports exceed the target level, a second surcharge is imposed on above-
target imports bringing the total out-of-target surcharge to 155 percent ad-valorem equivalent. 
This secondary surcharge is applied if a processing firm goes over its firm-level targeted imports.  11
However, if all firms exceeded their targets, they would all be paying the secondary surcharge. 
De facto, ALIC-MAFF’s trade policy for raw sugar mimics a TRQ scheme. The official tariff on 
raw sugar imports is zero. Refined sugar imports are effectively barred by prohibitive tariffs 
(about 623$/metric ton). These policy instrument levels for Japan are not notified to the WTO 
since officially they are not tariffs and their levels are approximate because of unavailable data 
(Dyck).  
U.S. TRQ Policy  
In the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (URAA), the United States agreed to maintain 
minimum imports of 1.139 million metric tons of raw value sugar imports including (22,000 
metric tons of refined sugar). The raw sugar TRQ was allocated to 40 quota-holding countries 
based on their historical export shares during 1975-81 when trade was relatively unrestricted. 
The duty of 0.625 cents per pound, raw value, continues on quota imports. Most countries 
continue to avoid the duty because of General System of Preference (GSP) or Caribbean Basin 
Initiative (CBI) programs. The duty on raw sugar above the tariff-rate quota was 17.62 cents per 
pound beginning in January 1995 and lowered by 0.45 cents per pound each year until it reached 
15.36 cents per pound in 2000 (190 percent in ad-valorem equivalent). The refined sugar above 
rate tariff was 18.62 cents/lb in 1995 and declined by 0.48 cent per year through 2000 to 16.21 
cent/lb. The over-quota tariff remains prohibitive even with a world price of about 5 cents per 
pound (assuming a raw sugar market price of 22 cents per pound and a transportation price of 1.5 
cents per pound).  
  The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) became effective on January 1, 
1994, and most trade barriers between Canada, Mexico, and the United States are being 
eliminated over the subsequent 15 years. The NAFTA sugar provisions were altered by a side-
letter agreement prior to the start of the NAFTA Agreement. According to the NAFTA side- 12
letter, Mexico’s low-tier tariff sugar exports to the United States are restricted by Mexico’s ‘net 
surplus production’ of sugar. The net surplus is defined as Mexico’s production of sugar less its 
consumption of sugar and high fructose corn syrup. From FY 2001 through 2007, Mexico is to 
have duty-free access to the U.S. market for the amount of its surplus, up to a maximum of 
250,000 metric tons raw value. Beginning in FY 2008, Mexico will have duty-free access with 
no quantitative limit. The high-tier tariff schedule for raw and refined sugar has been declining 
by an equal annual amount from 10.58 and 11.21 to zero, respectively, over the transition period 
to duty free access in 2008. Out-of-quota imports from Mexico have been occurring since 1998-
99. The model is calibrated to reflect the out-of-quota imports from Mexico induced by the lower 
out-of-quota tariff faced by Mexican sugar exports to the U.S. market. The tariff is set at the 
2000 level (ad-valorem equivalent to 133 percent). 
IV. Additional Assumptions  
A set of simplifying assumptions pertains to domestic policy programs. The GTAP 5.3 database 
reports production subsidies, input subsidies, and direct payments to capital and land, but does 
not account for supply control such as sugar marketing allotments in the United States or 
production quotas in the EU. Given the focus on import policies, the domestic sugar distortions 
are kept as described in the GTAP 5.3 database.  
Another difficulty arises with export subsidies and EU export subsidy commitments 
under the URAA. Whenever the EU increases its preferential imports, it has to decrease its 
subsidized production (quotas A and B), by roughly the same volume to meet subsidized exports 
volume commitments. Subsidized production equivalent to the increased preferential imports 
could not be exported without subsidy. The current analysis does not address this important 
aspect of the EU policy.  
The sectoral definition of sugar crops and sugar in the GTAP 5.3 database is  13
heterogeneous across countries. The sugar-crop sector includes raw cane sugar in some countries 
and as a result shows some trade flows for these nontraded crops. Further, the sugar sector 
includes refined sugar in some countries and both raw and refined sugar in others. To avoid this 
inconsistency, we aggregate the sugar crop and sugar sector in an aggregate sugar sector. Besides 
sugar, the sectoral disaggregation is similar to that of van der Mensbrugghe (2003a). 
A final issue is the sharing (parameter χ in equation (3)) of the rent between importers 
and exporters, which is parameterized in the model. In the EU and the United States, the sharing 
is 75% to importers and 25% to exporters, except for Mexican imports going to the United 
States, for which the sharing is 50%. In Japan, 100% of the rents go to importers. This parameter, 
is important in the analysis since it influences the incentive to export and the inter-country 
welfare implications of changing TRQ schemes. The range of parameter χ is limited by the 
calibration as explained in the model section since it is found by solving a set of equations such 
as (15)-(16) for each country. 
V. Scenarios 
For each country, the analysis considers three types of market access reform scenarios: (i) a 33- 
percent increase in EU and U.S. TRQs, and in the Japanese import target. We call these scenarios 
EUQTA, USQTA, and JPQTA, respectively; (ii) a 33-percent decrease in out-of-quota tariffs 
(out-of-target surcharge in Japan) referred to as (EUTAR, USTAR, JPTAR scenarios); (iii) a 
scenario combining reforms described in (i) and (ii) (EULIB, USLIB, JPLIB scenarios). Then, a 
“QUAD” market access scenario is run, combining the three countries’ reforms (QDQTA, 
QDTAR, QDLIB scenarios).
2 The last two scenarios look at multilateral reforms. First we 
combine a 33-percent multilateral tariff reduction in all countries along with the QUAD TRQ 
                                                                  
2 Canada is not included in the definition of the QUAD used here.  14
reform (MLTLT scenario). The last scenario is a full liberalization scenario with all tariffs set to 
zero (FLLB).  
The scenarios are shown in Table 1 with the value of the policy parameters implied by 
each reform starting from the baseline. Bold characters indicate the changing parameter values. 
A caveat on the TRQ scenarios is that the state of the world regarding import flows in the 
baseline determines to a large extent which exporting countries will benefit from the expansion 
of the aggregate TRQ in the importing country. Our modeling approach does not allow for least-
cost producers to enter a market if the latter did not already export to that market prior to the 
TRQ expansion. Hence we are simulating the deleterious impact of an expansion of the existing 
TRQ systems and their trade preferences, rather than a genuine increase in market access open to 
all potential exporters. The latter is the essence of the multilateral trade reform scenarios.  
VI. Results   
Results are presented in Tables 2-7. The tariff reforms in each individual country have a 
moderate effect on production (Table 3), trade flows (Table 2 and 4), quota rents (Table 2), 
welfare (Tables 5 and 6), and prices (Table 7). By contrast, the quota reforms induce much larger 
changes in the variables. Results of individual country’s reforms are nearly additive in two 
directions. First, for each country, the effects on major variables of the combined quota 
expansion and tariff reduction (EULIB, USLIB, and JPLIB scenarios) are the sum of the effect 
of each individual instrument reform (EUQTA and EUTAR, USQTA and USTAR, JPQTA and 
JPTAR). Second, The QUAD scenarios (e.g., QUDQTA) are also nearly additive in the effects 
of the corresponding reform in each country (the sum of EUQTA, USQTA, and JPQTA effects).  
In the combined reforms (tariff reduction cum quota expansion), the quota expansion is 
the binding policy instrument for the EU, Japan, and the United States, noting the NAFTA 
exception (out-of-quota imports from Mexico to the United States). A policy implication is that  15
out-of-quota tariff cuts for sugar should be much more substantial than what we have modeled to 
become effective in a TRQ reform combining tariffs reductions and quota expansion. Table 2 
shows the average unit rent premium remaining with each reform. The dispersion within 
exporters is very limited except for Brazilian exports to the EU receiving lower rents. The out-of-
quota tariffs should fall below the rent value shown in Table 2 to have an effect on trade flows. 
In the scenarios involving tariff-reductions alone, limited out-of-quota imports occur in 
Japan, originating from Thailand, Australia-New Zealand, Rest of Latin and Central America, 
and the Rest of Asia in decreasing order. In the same scenarios, out-of-quota imports to the EU 
come from the Rest of sub-Saharan Africa, Rest of Latin and Central America, Rest of Asia, 
SACU, India, East and Central Europe (ECE), and MENA countries in decreasing order. What is 
striking is the diversity of patterns of export expansion opportunities corresponding to tariff 
liberalization in each of the three liberalizing countries. Finally in the United States, Mexican 
sugar exports are the only out-of-quota import expansion resulting from the lower tariffs.  
As shown in Table 3, production expands moderately with the reforms induced in the 
three OECD countries. Hence a 33-percent tariff cut or a 33-percent quota expansion would not 
induce great changes in production flows and income-generating opportunities for sugar 
exporters. The multilateral scenarios (last column of Table 3) shows the varying fortune of sugar 
exporters in different policy regimes. A more integrated world market as implied by the last 
scenarios induces production and trade expansion by the least-cost producers (Brazil, Thailand, 
Australia-New Zealand, and Rest of Latin and Central America). However, output contraction is 
induced in countries favored by the EU and U.S. TRQ systems, but which are not truly 
competitive without preferential trade. The contrast between the QLIB column and the last two 
columns in Table 3 vividly makes this point on misallocation of resources induced by current 
preferential trade agreements. ECE, and MENA countries cannot produce competitively and see  16
their output contract under multilateral tariff reductions as compared to the baseline situation. 
The rest of Sub-Saharan Africa sees its production expansion falls moving from the 
QUAD liberalization to the partial multilateral liberalization (MLTLT) but eventually pick up 
again as prices rise with full liberalization (FLLB) (last three columns of Table 3). Export 
patterns reflect production patterns with a considerable expansion of exports for low-cost 
producers under the MLTLT and FLLB scenario relative to the other scenarios. The exception is 
the Rest of Central and Latin America who fares well under both the QUAD liberalization 
(QUDLIB) and the multilateral reforms (MLTLT and FLLB) as shown in the last three columns 
of Table 4.  
The welfare effects of the reforms are first measured using changes in real GDP at base-
market prices relative to real GDP in the baseline. These are shown in Table 5. These effects are 
modest by design since the shocks are incremental, resulting in moderate effects on trade and 
resource allocation. Full multilateral trade liberalization scenarios (last column of Table 5) would 
induce about 1.6 billion dollars of additional real GDP with the largest gains going to the 
liberalizing countries, ECE and Brazil. The reforming countries, gain by reducing inefficiencies 
in both consumption and production.  
The gains in the QUAD countries under full liberalization are larger than those obtained 
under the narrower QUAD reforms because of the lowest tariffs achieved in the former. 
However, partial liberalization (MLTLT) induces higher sugar import unit cost than the QUAD 
reforms do and the welfare gains under MLTLT are lower relative to those under the QUAD 
reforms –a trade off between lower tariffs and higher import unit cost before tariffs. The EU 
appears to gain more from its reforms than the United States and Japan do, which is consistent 
with the respective size of their TRQ imports. The EU has the largest quota.  
In Table 6, we provide Equivalent Variation (EV) to the policy changes (the difference in  17
expenditures at base prices to reach the new and old utility levels). Aggregate results are larger  
(2.948 billion dollars of aggregate welfare gains). However, the gains for the United States 
appear smaller when measured by EV relative to the real GDP measure. This result is caused by 
negative feedback effects of the reforms on nominal income and prices in the sugar, food, and 
service sectors via the balance of trade constraint. The United States sees factor income increases 
(an appreciation) because of the stronger demand for its manufacturing good exports –Brazil and 
other exporters increase their imports of manufacturing goods. The United States has a large 
service sector, which can absorb higher factor prices and a resulting increase in service price 
because the latter sector has a large nontraded component. The net effect of lower sugar price, 
higher manufacturing, and service prices is barely positive for the United States in the partial 
multilateral liberalization and slightly negative for the full liberalization scenario. The 
combination of these offsetting effects appears less favorable with the EV measure than with the 
real GDP measure. By contrast, Brazil appears to gain more with the EV measure relative to the 
real GDP metric. Note that these effects are small relative to the baseline income levels, 
especially for the three reforming OECD countries.   
Our results on the U.S. policy and partial multilateral policy reforms are consistent in 
directions and magnitudes with those of Elbehri et al. for comparable scenarios, keeping in mind 
that they did not model the Japanese sugar policy and used different tariff values. However, for 
the EU we have different results especially for reforms with tariff reductions. The differences 
originate in the assumption regarding out-of-quota imports by the EU. Elbehri et al. include 
intra-EU trade in EU international trade resulting in the EU importing above its TRQs, which it 
is not in reality. The EU TRQ expansion has little impact in this context since EU imports exceed 
the quota already. Our welfare results are also consistent with Borrell and Pearce. 
The price effects of the reforms indicate that full liberalization would induce sizable  18
increases in import and export unit cost for sugar. Given the model structure with differentiated 
import and export goods, we have different prices for imported sugar and exported sugar. The 
import price for the three QUAD countries would increase by 12 percent (EU), 36 percent (the 
United States), and 11 percent (Japan). The export unit price would increase substantially for 
major exporters as shown in the last column of Table 7. The range of increases is relatively wide 
expressing the variation of cost structures across countries, and has an average increase of 15 
percent for the exporters shown in the Table. 
We also ran a homogeneous-good version of the model (see appendix B for details) in 
order to compute a “true” world price rather than an index of bilateral prices as implied by the 
Armington structure. We ran a full multilateral trade liberalization scenario. This exercise leads 
to a 21 percent increase in the world price of sugar. It is also worth noting that welfare gains 
quadruple with the latter version of the model to reach $13.6 billions, which could be consider an 
upper bound on welfare gains from liberalizing sugar markets.  This exercise also show how 
sensitive welfare effects can be to assumptions regarding trade structure. 
VII. Conclusions and Policy Implications 
We used MCP programming to implement TRQs in the global CGE LINKAGE model. Then  we 
used this methodological development to analyze TRQ schemes in sugar markets in the EU, 
United States, and Japan. The parameterization of the Japanese policy is an original aspect of our 
paper. We looked at reforms of TRQ and TRQ-like schemes in these countries, as well as 
multilateral trade liberalization. We found that a 33-percent multilateral decrease of ad-valorem 
tariffs, combined with a 33-percent increase in imports under TRQ-like schemes in the EU, the 
United States, and Japan, induces a global welfare gain of about 889 million dollars. But we also 
found that these three countries’ trade policies create substantial trade diversion, excluding most 
low-cost producers from trading opportunities. The current diversion benefits some LDCs’  19
producers because of granted bilateral TRQ allocations. We also found that full multilateral trade 
liberalization induces global welfare gains of  about $3 billion. 
Three major policy implications emerge from our analysis. First, market access with TRQ 
expansion in the EU, the United States, and Japan has a significant effect on trade expansion, but 
it continues the trade diversion intrinsic to the bilateral sugar TRQs put in place by the EU and 
the United States. Africa clearly would benefit from such an export expansion under the EU 
quota expansion. This is less true under the multilateral liberalization scenario. Conversely Brazil 
fares poorly under the TRQ expansions, but does much better in the multilateral tariff reduction 
in terms of export market expansion. Hence, there is an issue of transfer and redistribution within 
developing exporters of sugar. Currently the lowest-cost exporters are kept out of the EU market, 
which benefits several LDCs exporters.   
Second, reforms should consider dramatic cuts in sugar tariffs relative to the quota 
expansion targeted by market access. Relative decreases in out-of-quota tariffs of the same order 
as the quota expansion will have very little or no impact on trade and welfare. To have any effect 
on sugar trade the tariff (surcharge in Japan) cuts will have to be very large and be larger in the 
United States than in Japan and the EU.  Third and last, the Japanese surcharge and state trading 
have to be brought into the URAA framework, tariffied and notified to the WTO. It is amazing 
that Japanese policy makers got away with such lack of policy discipline until now. 
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Appendix A. Implementation of TRQs in a Global CGE Model 
Global model 
 
This appendix shows how to implement TRQs in a global model with TRQs assigned on a 
bilateral basis. 
 
Equation (A1) represents the bilateral domestic price of imports inclusive of import taxes and the 
quota premium. It is equal to the price of exports produced in region r destined for region r' 
times the adjustment factors. The in-quota and out-of-quota tariff rates are bilaterally specified 
(as is the quota level), and the quota premium will also be bilateral. Nominal national income 
will depend on how the bilaterally determined quota revenues are shared with trading partners. 
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The same double-nested Armington structure is maintained in the global model. Equations (A4)-
(A6) describe the top level CES nest. Equations (A7) and (A8) describe the second-level nest 
where WTF represents the flow from region r' to region r, i.e. exports are read across a row and 
imports down a column. 
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Similarly equations (A9)-(A11) describe the top-level CET nest, and equations (A12)-(A14) the 
second level CET nest which determines export supply from market r to market r', with the 
composite export price (equation (A14)): 
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Equations (A15) through (A18) correspond to equations (11)-(14) of the original model and need 
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Equation (A19) describes the balance of payments equation and as above can be derived from a 
combination of the equations above and therefore represents Walras’ Law. The model assumes 
that the current account is in balance for each region. 
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Appendix B. Homogenous-good version of the model 
This second appendix reports sugar trade liberalization analysis obtained with a homogenous-
commodity version of the LINKAGE model. The LINKAGE model was reformulated to 
accommodate the homogenous commodity assumption in sugar with the following major 
changes. The bilateral trade flows in sugar are replaced by imports from and exports to a single 
world market with a single prevailing world market price. Net trade in sugar replaces two-ways 
trade. The policy coverage is represented by ad-valorem equivalent of the trade distortions as 
shown in GTAP 5.3, with a modification to remove intra-EU sugar trade. In the latter country, 
the ad-valorem equivalent calculation of the trade distortions excludes intra-EU trade to provide 
a better representation of the trade barriers faced by the rest of the world exporting to the 
aggregate EU. Results have illustrative value and represent a long-term impact given that price 
responses are high in the model. The results show that both versions (Armington, homogeneous-
good) of the model provide consistent results on welfare, trade flows, and production relocation 
despite the different treatment of trade and policies.
3 The single price effect is the distinct feature 
of the homogeneous-good version of the model.  
                                                                  
3 SACU is the exception. The Armington model predicts an expansion of SACU output and trade whereas the homogeneous 
commodity model predicts the opposite.  23
We report on a full multilateral trade liberalization scenario.  
 
Impact on production and consumption 
As expected, results provide the same directions of changes as the Armington version of the 
model does, but with sharper contrasts. The full liberalization scenario induces the virtual 
elimination of sugar production in the EU, Japan, and SACU, and the near elimination of the 
U.S. sugar industry (-94% drop). Aggregate world sugar output and demand contracts by 1%. 
The final demand component of total sugar demand increases by 3% with large increases in all 
formerly protected countries (EU (47%), Japan (45%), the United States (27%), and SACU 
(22%)).  
 
The world price increases by 21% which is close to the increase in the average import 
cost and average export unit value for key countries in the Armington version of the model,
4 but 
of course roughly 2.5 times the increase in the average sugar price variable (AWP) reached with 
the Armington version of the model. These comparisons are tenuous since the latter indices are   
weighted average of increases in bilateral-trade prices. Production increases strongly in Australia 
(192%), Thailand (99%), and CIS (200%) but less in Brazil. In the latter the change in producer 
price is less pronounced because there is a border distortion and the net producer price increase 
(world price increase net of the tariff removal) is moderate. 
 
Sugar trade expands. The set of countries expanding trade is similar to the one obtained 
under the Armington version of the model. Formally protected markets exhibit higher import 
flows because the impact of the removal of the distortion net of the world price increase is 
beneficial in these countries. The EU increases its imports by 15 billion dollars, the United States 
by 4 billion dollars and Japan by 1.6 billion dollars. These figures are huge and illustrative of the 
large trade effects at work. The EU trade impact is probably larger than what one could 
realistically expect. Competitive exporters, Australia, Brazil, Rest of Latin and Central America, 
Thailand, increase their exports by 5, 1, 2.1, and 1.9 billion dollars respectively. The comparison 
of trade flows between the two versions of the model is tenuous because we are comparing net 
and gross trade flows. 
 
Welfare impact 
The welfare effects are qualitatively unchanged when compared to the Armington version of the 
model, although they are much larger in aggregate in the homogenous-good model. Aggregate 
welfare measured by EV increases by 13.6 billion dollars. Among exporters, major gains accrue 
to Australia-New Zealand (1.5 billion dollars), Brazil (0.7 billion dollars), Rest of Latin and 
Central America (1 billion dollars), and Thailand (0.7 billion dollars). Among major importers, 
the EU and Japan gain from the liberalization (5.5 and 1 billion dollars), and the United States 
loses (-1 billion dollars). This contrasting result among importers is explained as follows based 
on a decomposition of EV into a disposable income component and consumption price 
component.  
                                                                  
4 In the Armington version of the model, the import price would increase by 12 percent (EU), 36 percent (UNITED STATES), 
and 11 percent (Japan). The export unit price would increase substantially for major exporters. The range of increases is 
relatively wide expressing the variation of cost structures across countries and with an average increase of 15 percent for the key 
exporters included in the model. 
  24
 
The EU “devalues” (lower net factor income) by decreasing factor returns to enable large 
sugar imports (three times the level of U.S. imports) and benefits with lower domestic prices 
(sugar price via liberalization, and other sectors’ prices via lower cost). Japan “appreciates” 
because of increased foreign demand for manufacturing good, raising the price of these goods. 
As a result Japanese domestic prices other than sugar increase and net income increases as well 
(appreciation). The sum of these effects is positive. The United States sees factor income 
increased (an appreciation) because of the stronger demand for its manufacturing good exports –
Brazil and other exporters increase their imports of manufacturing goods. The United States has 
a large service sector, which can absorb higher factor prices and a resulting increase in service 
price. The latter sector has a large nontraded component. The net effect of lower sugar price, 
higher manufacturing prices, and service prices is negative for the United States.  
 
Two asymmetries between the three countries explain their diverging fortunes following 
sugar trade liberalization. After trade liberalization the EU is a much larger importer than the 
United States and Japan. EU domestic production was more than twice as large as the U.S. 
production was and sugar import volume is just much larger for the EU than for the United 
States (3 times) or Japan (nearly 8 times). This explains why the EU experiences a devaluation 
via lower factor return. The United States and Japan have smaller sugar imports but have a 
different degree of trade opening. Japan’s economy is a more open and manufacturing-intensive 
than the U.S. economy. This explains the appreciation is stronger in Japan than in the United 
States since manufacturing prices cannot rise as much as services prices which have a larger 
nontraded component. 
 
The higher world price of sugar plays little role in the economic forces at work 
explaining the welfare effects in these three countries. The stronger the increase in world prices, 
the lower the welfare gains related to the trade liberalization via the sugar domestic price, but the 
logic of the necessary appreciation/depreciation and resulting decrease/increase in manufacturing 
and service prices remain unchanged. The treatment of sugar as a homogenous commodity (as 
opposed to an Armington structure) has little bearing on the qualitative results. 
 
In this homogeneous-good version of the model we still get the discrepancy between the 
two welfare measures for the United States (real income at market prices and the equivalent 
variation). The discrepancy results from the different weighting of the various price effects and 
the way price and income effects are aggregated. In the EV decomposition, the price effects 
weighed by consumption expenditure shares are subtracted from the disposable income effect. In 
the real GDP measure, the numerator includes disposable income and trade, which is then 
deflated by a GDP deflator that aggregates the various price changes using weights not identical 
to expenditure shares. We note that in all cases, the aggregate welfare effects are small when 
expressed in percentage of disposable income (of the order of 0.06 percent for the globe). Table 1. Policy parameters setting by scenario (ad valorem tariffs (in percent) and quotas (in millions dollars of 1995)) 
Policy by country\scenario baseline EUQTA EUTAR EULIB USQTA USTAR USLIB JPQTA JPTAR JPLIB QDQTA QDTAR QDLIB MLTLT FLLB
EU
t a r i f f  i n  q u o t a 00000000000000 0
t a r i f f  i n - B r a z i l 4 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 9 0
tariff out of quota 174 174 116 116 174 174 174 174 174 174 174 116 116 116 0
aggregate quota 971 1294 971 1294 971 971 971 971 971 971 1294 971 1294 1294 unrestricted
USA
t a r i f f  i n  q u o t a 00000000000000 0
tariff out of quota except Mexico 190 190 190 190 190 127 127 190 190 190 190 127 127 127 0
tariff out of quota Mexico 131 131 131 131 131 87 87 131 131 131 131 87 87 87 0
aggregate quota  898 898 898 898 1197 898 1197 898 898 898 1197 898 1197 1197 unrestricted
Japan
tariff out of quota 155 155 155 155 155 155 155 155 103 103 155 103 103 103 0
tariff in quota 84 84 84 84 84 84 84 84 84 84 84 84 84 84 0
aggregate quota 409 409 409 409 409 409 409 546 409 546 546 409 546 546 unrestricted
Other countries
Tariffs constant constant constant constant constant constant constant constant constant constant constant constant constant 3% reductio 100% reduction
Aggregate quota for a country is the sum of sugar imports under quota reported in GTAP5 and aggregated over exporting countries in the country aggregation of LINKAGE 5.
Table 2. Impact of sugar policy reforms on unit quota rents, out-of-quota imports, and total imports
Impact by country\scenario baseline EUQTA EUTAR EULIB USQTA USTAR USLIB JPQTA JPTAR JPLIB QDQTA QDTAR QDLIB MLTLT FLLB
EU
average unit rent (% of cif price) 138 67 153 73 180 138 135 137 137 137 66 153 71 93 0
out-quota imports (million dollars) 0 0 110 00000000 1 0 9 00 -
aggregate imports (million dollars)
1
3108 3491 3205 3491 3108 3108 3108 3108 3108 3108 3491 3204 3492 3614 6398
change in aggregate imports (%) 12% 3% 12% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 12% 3% 12% 16% 106%
2137 2197 2234 2197 2138 2137 2138 2137 2137 2137 2197 2233 2198 2320
USA
average unit rent (% of cif price) 87 85 87 85 25 114 25 115 87 87 23 113 24 31 0
out-quota imports (million dollars) 4 4 440804440800 -
aggregate imports (million dollars) 1092 1092 1092 1092 1451 1096 1451 1092 1092 1092 1451 1096 1451 1451 1829
change in aggregate imports (%) 0% 0% 0% 33% 0% 33% 0% 0% 0% 33% 0% 33% 33% 67%
Japan
average unit rent (% of cif price) 32 31 31 31 30 32 30 0 24 0 0 24 0 16 0
out-quota imports (million dollars) 0 0 000000 3 4 00 3 3 00 -
aggregate imports (million dollars) 408 408 408 408 408 408 408 510 444 510 502 444 502 544 1079
change in aggregate imports (%) 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 25% 9% 25% 23% 9% 23% 33% 164%
1. Figures Include intra-EU sugar trade.    26
Table 3. Impact of reforms on aggregate sugar production  by major countries (in million dollars of 1995)
baseline (bau EUQTA EUTAR EULIB USQTA USTAR USLIB JPQTA JPTAR JPLIB QDQTA QDTAR QDLIB MLTLT FLLB
Producing countries output level  change
1
change change change change change change change change change change change change change
EU 31001 -2.48% -0.66% -2.48% 0.07% 0.00% 0.07% 0.02% 0.01% 0.02% -2.37% -0.65% -2.38% -1.46% -9.09%
USA 10222 0.09% 0.02% 0.09% -9.68% -0.11% -9.68% 0.02% 0.01% 0.02% -9.56% -0.08% -9.54% -9.28% -14.60%
Japan 5247 0.01% 0.00% 0.01% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% -7.54% -2.74% -7.54% -6.96% -2.70% -6.95% -9.82% -39.16%
Canada 273 0.90% 0.26% 0.90% 4.91% 0.00% 4.91% 0.44% 0.16% 0.44% 6.09% 0.41% 6.09% 5.94% 14.57%
Australia-New Zealand 3132 0.15% 0.04% 0.15% 0.88% 0.00% 0.88% 0.51% 0.19% 0.51% 1.50% 0.22% 1.50% 2.67% 8.48%
Argentina 3101 0.05% 0.01% 0.05% 0.37% 0.00% 0.37% 0.01% 0.00% 0.01% 0.43% 0.01% 0.43% 0.51% 1.59%
Brazil 15479 0.05% 0.00% 0.05% 0.23% 0.00% 0.23% 0.02% 0.01% 0.02% 0.30% 0.01% 0.30% 1.15% 3.98%
China 1622 0.23% 0.06% 0.23% 0.38% 0.00% 0.38% 0.17% 0.05% 0.17% 0.77% 0.11% 0.77% -1.02% -1.41%
India 20877 0.08% 0.03% 0.08% 0.02% 0.00% 0.02% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.10% 0.03% 0.10% 0.15% 1.00%
Rest of Asia 17684 0.20% 0.05% 0.20% 0.23% 0.00% 0.23% 0.16% 0.06% 0.16% 0.60% 0.11% 0.60% -0.06% 1.00%
Rest of Central and Latin America 8667 0.88% 0.20% 0.88% 1.21% 0.00% 1.21% 0.15% 0.05% 0.15% 2.19% 0.25% 2.19% 2.53% 7.72%
East and Central Europe 7919 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.16% 0.00% 0.16% 0.02% 0.01% 0.02% 0.17% 0.01% 0.17% -2.66% -10.82%
CIS 1099 0.22% 0.03% 0.22% 0.56% 0.00% 0.56% 0.13% 0.05% 0.13% 0.89% 0.08% 0.88% 2.79% 18.14%
MENA 10325 -0.53% -0.14% -0.53% 0.16% 0.00% 0.16% 0.04% 0.01% 0.04% -0.33% -0.13% -0.33% -2.17% -7.93%
SACU 998 2.66% 0.60% 2.66% 0.80% 0.00% 0.80% 0.68% 0.24% 0.68% 3.89% 0.78% 3.89% 1.55% 12.80%
Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa 4835 2.66% 0.69% 2.66% 0.52% 0.00% 0.52% 0.05% 0.02% 0.05% 3.22% 0.71% 3.22% 1.56% 15.95%
Mexico 5032 0.07% 0.01% 0.07% 0.06% 0.07% 0.06% 0.01% 0.00% 0.01% 0.14% 0.08% 0.14% 0.58% 2.45%
Thailand 2654 0.11% 0.03% 0.11% 0.18% 0.00% 0.18% 0.71% 0.26% 0.71% 1.01% 0.29% 1.01% 1.90% 6.62%
Total 150168 -0.33% -0.09% -0.33% -0.43% 0.00% -0.43% -0.19% -0.07% -0.19% -0.94% -0.16% -0.94% -1.09% -3.09%
1. Changes are % difference from bau levels
Table 4. Impact of reforms on aggregate sugar exports by exporting countries (in million dollars of 1995)
baseline (bau EUQTA EUTAR EULIB USQTA USTAR USLIB JPQTA JPTAR JPLIB QDQTA QDTAR QDLIB MLTLT FLLB
Exporting Countries export level  change
1
change change change change change change change change change change change change change
Australia New Zealand 634 0.61% 0.15% 0.61% 3.48% 0.00% 3.48% 1.99% 0.73% 1.99% 5.93% 0.88% 5.93% 10.67% 34.15%
Argentina 69 2.16% 0.49% 2.16% 15.42% 0.00% 15.42% 0.36% 0.13% 0.36% 17.91% 0.60% 17.91% 26.37% 86.58%
Brazil 1452 0.47% 0.00% 0.47% 2.20% 0.00% 2.20% 0.21% 0.07% 0.21% 2.88% 0.08% 2.87% 10.91% 38.01%
India 222 10.71% 4.45% 10.71% 2.32% 0.00% 2.32% 0.14% 0.02% 0.14% 13.20% 4.49% 13.20% 27.99% 166.37%
Rest of Asia 531 9.41% 2.51% 9.41% 6.89% 0.00% 6.89% 1.01% 0.23% 1.01% 17.35% 2.70% 17.35% 24.18% 145.25%
Rest of Latin and Central America 1991 4.67% 1.08% 4.67% 6.98% 0.00% 6.98% 0.77% 0.27% 0.77% 12.22% 1.32% 12.22% 19.32% 63.42%
Eastern and Central Europe 315 6.40% 1.80% 6.40% 1.70% 0.00% 1.70% 0.18% 0.09% 0.18% 8.27% 1.89% 8.27% 42.38% 365.59%
CIS 265 0.79% 0.13% 0.79% 0.47% 0.00% 0.47% 0.09% 0.03% 0.09% 1.33% 0.16% 1.32% 24.43% 154.81%
MENA 97 10.65% 2.85% 10.65% 3.25% 0.00% 3.25% 2.30% 0.72% 2.30% 16.58% 3.62% 16.58% 28.76% 222.93%
SACU 311 9.28% 2.05% 9.28% 2.79% 0.00% 2.79% 2.47% 0.89% 2.47% 13.71% 2.73% 13.71% 31.41% 165.93%
Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa 608 25.72% 6.73% 25.72% 3.35% 0.00% 3.35% 0.10% 0.03% 0.10% 29.15% 6.77% 29.15% 34.16% 232.26%
Mexico 148 1.88% 0.36% 1.88% 4.76% 2.21% 4.76% 0.22% 0.08% 0.22% 6.90% 2.63% 6.89% 22.13% 87.33%
Thailand 903 0.27% 0.06% 0.27% 0.43% 0.00% 0.43% 1.71% 0.63% 1.71% 2.44% 0.70% 2.44% 4.58% 15.99%
Total for above exporters 7545 5.33% 1.37% 5.33% 3.91% 0.04% 3.91% 0.85% 0.30% 0.85% 9.99% 1.69% 9.99% 18.88% 95.54%
1. Changes are percent differences from bau levels   27
Table 5. Impact of sugar trade reforms on real GDP at base market prices (in million of dollars of 1995)
Countries\sc EUQTA EUTAR EULIB USQTA USTAR USLIB JPQTA JPTAR JPLIB QDQTA QDTAR QDLIB MLTLT FLLB
EU 349 98 349 -7 0 -7 -2 -1 -2 338 96 339 285 1096
USA -1 0 -1 206 3 206 0 0 0 206 3 206 207 324
Japan 1 0 1 -1 0 -1 111 43 111 103 43 103 141 338
C a n a d a 00 0- 30- 30 00- 30- 3- 4 - 1 2
Australia-Ne 00 0- 40- 40 00- 40- 4- 4 - 1 3
A r g e n t i n a 00 0- 20- 20 00- 10- 1- 2- 6
B r a z i l101101101303 3 1 1 1 0
China -1 0 -1 -2 0 -2 -1 0 -1 -4 -1 -4 8 11
India -5 -2 -5 0 0 0 0 0 0 -5 -2 -5 0 -33
Rest of Asia -10 -3 -10 -5 0 -5 0 0 0 -16 -3 -16 2 -96
Rest of Cent -25 -6 -25 -14 0 -14 2 1 2 -39 -5 -39 -19 -131
E a s t  a n d  C e 10 1- 20- 20 00- 10- 1 1 1 9 3 0 8
C I S 101101000202 1 4 4
M E N A00 0- 10- 10 00- 10- 15 - 7 2
SACU -6 -1 -6 -1 0 -1 1 0 1 -5 -1 -5 31 51
Rest of Sub- -29 -7 -29 -3 0 -3 0 0 0 -32 -7 -32 -19 -284
Mexico -1 0 -1 -2 -2 -2 0 0 0 -2 -2 -2 -2 -8
T h a i l a n d 0000002122124 1 4
Total 276 80 276 160 2 160 114 44 114 539 125 540 796 1602
Table 6. Impact of sugar trade reforms on welfare (EV measures in million 1995 dollars)
Countries\Sc EUQTA EUTAR EULIB USQTA USTAR USLIB JPQTA JPTAR JPLIB QDQTA QDTAR QDLIB MLTLT FLLB
EU 227 64 227 -16 0 -16 -6 -2 -6 200 62 201 192 -352
USA -13 -3 -13 80 1 80 -3 -1 -3 60 -3 60 63 -78
Japan 2 1 2 1 0 1 216 85 216 202 85 202 279 614
Canada 3 1 3 15 0 15 -1 0 -1 17 1 17 12 25
Australia-Ne 313909525 1 6 2 1 6 2 6 1 0 5
A r g e n t i n a 0001010002020 - 1
Brazil 5 0 5 24 0 24 2 1 2 31 1 31 100 377
C h i n a - 10- 1- 70- 7- 10- 1- 90- 9 1 3 1 6
I n d i a 212000 - 10 - 1 1118 3 2
Rest of Asia 16 5 16 -3 0 -3 -12 -4 -12 1 0 1 27 94
Rest of Cent 52 12 52 87 0 87 9 3 9 149 15 149 189 643
East and Ce 19 5 19 -1 0 -1 -1 0 -1 17 5 17 136 369
C I S 7 2 7- 8 0- 8- 2- 1- 2- 22- 22 0 1 3 8
MENA 57 15 57 -5 0 -5 0 0 0 52 15 52 53 245
S A C U1 121 13 0 3 3 1 31 631 6 5 6 2 1 4
Rest of Sub- 50 13 50 4 0 4 0 0 0 54 13 54 47 338
M e x i c o 2027070009095 1 0
Thailand 2 1 2 3 0 3 14 5 14 19 6 19 38 157
Total 443 121 443 194 1 194 222 87 222 836 207 837 1265 2948 28
Table 7. Impact of sugar trade reforms on import and export prices (percent deviation from baseline)
1
Countries\Scenarios EUQTA EUTAR EULIB USQTA USTAR USLIB JPQTA JPTAR JPLIB QDQTA QDTAR QDLIB MLTLT FLLB
EU 2.76% 2.30% 2.76% 0.46% 0.00% 0.46% 0.11% 0.04% 0.11% 3.31% 2.33% 3.33% 3.07% 11.56%
USA 1.23% 0.28% 1.23% 15.91% 0.51% 15.91% 0.35% 0.12% 0.35% 17.51% 0.91% 17.50% 17.88% 36.46%
Japan 0.45% 0.10% 0.45% 0.60% 0.00% 0.60% 0.80% 0.29% 0.80% 1.86% 0.39% 1.86% 2.66% 10.62%
Australia-New Zealand 0.22% 0.07% 0.22% 2.36% 0.01% 2.36% 0.58% 0.21% 0.58% 3.14% 0.29% 3.14% 4.55% 13.34%
Argentina 0.17% 0.04% 0.17% 6.26% 0.04% 6.26% 0.03% 0.01% 0.03% 6.47% 0.08% 6.47% 6.69% 14.47%
Brazil 0.29% 0.02% 0.29% 1.32% 0.01% 1.32% 0.03% 0.01% 0.03% 1.65% 0.04% 1.65% 2.85% 8.57%
India 3.15% 3.10% 3.15% 0.53% 0.00% 0.53% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 3.68% 3.11% 3.68% 3.51% 14.20%
Rest of Asia 2.77% 1.81% 2.77% 2.75% 0.02% 2.75% 0.28% 0.10% 0.28% 5.81% 1.91% 5.81% 4.39% 15.06%
Rest of Central and Latin America 3.03% 1.30% 3.03% 5.38% 0.03% 5.38% 0.25% 0.09% 0.25% 8.66% 1.39% 8.66% 9.10% 24.76%
East and Central Europe 1.48% 1.12% 1.48% 0.45% 0.00% 0.45% 0.02% 0.01% 0.02% 1.95% 1.13% 1.95% -1.14% -3.66%
CIS 0.38% 0.15% 0.38% 0.48% 0.00% 0.48% 0.10% 0.03% 0.10% 0.94% 0.18% 0.94% 1.27% 9.40%
MENA 2.14% 1.68% 2.14% 1.03% 0.01% 1.03% 0.02% 0.01% 0.02% 3.19% 1.70% 3.19% 1.61% 6.95%
SACU 5.43% 2.19% 5.43% 1.86% 0.01% 1.86% 0.68% 0.25% 0.68% 7.85% 2.34% 7.85% 4.21% 21.76%
Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa 8.77% 5.35% 8.77% 1.60% 0.01% 1.60% 0.02% 0.01% 0.02% 10.40% 5.37% 10.41% 8.32% 37.67%
Mexico 0.71% 0.33% 0.71% 3.63% 2.72% 3.63% 0.02% 0.01% 0.02% 4.40% 3.04% 4.39% 5.68% 17.20%
Thailand 0.28% 0.08% 0.28% 0.49% 0.00% 0.49% 1.36% 0.50% 1.36% 2.17% 0.58% 2.17% 3.96% 15.07%
1for importing counrtries (EU, USA, Japan) the price is the average import unit cost before tariff  at the border. For the other countries the price is an average export unit price at the border.  